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LORD COKE.
I ventured upon a former occasion to offer to the readers of this
Review a sketch of John Selden. In the course of a desultory inves-
tigation of his life and times, I became interested in another singular
personality whose life, opinions and character offer a marked contrast.
Lord Coke was also a lawyer. He and Selden were contempo-
raries, breathed the same air, mingled with the same companions,
were educated in the same schools and bred to the same profession;
yet no two men could have been more unlike. Selden was broad, toler-
ant, kind; his justice was mild; and every man was his friend. Coke
was narrow, intolerant, cruel; his law was harsh and technical; and
he was friend to no man. Selden is wellnigh forgotten, whereas Coke
is today one of the revered sages of the law. By what caprice of des-
tiny hath this wrong been wrought? Let us examine the life of Lord
Coke and search out the answer to the riddle.
Edward Lord Coke was born February 1, 1551. He was well
educated, began the study of law at Clifford's Inn in 1571, and after
six years was called to the bar. Almost immediately after his admis-
sion he was elected Reader of Lyon's Inn, an honor usually reserved
for an older man. His progress was amazingly rapid. He was elected
Recorder of Coventry, then of London, and later became in turn
Solicitor General, Attorney General, Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas and Chief Justice of the King's Bench. He was elected to parlia-
ment in 1593, nullo contradicente, or as he himself proudly proclaimed,
"sine ambitu seu aliqua requisitione ex parte mea," and retained his
seat for many years. How much he was assisted by his talents, industry
and learning and how much by the base art of flattery, at which he was
an adept, it is impossible to tell. He married twice, both times profitably.
We know that he was meanly subservient to all in- power and relent-
lessly eager in the pursuit of wealth and office. That his rapid eleva-
tion was in some measure due to his connection with the Cecil family
cannot be doubted. He pleased the king by his obsequious behavior as
the Prosecutor of the Crown; but as soon as he had achieved his am-
bition and become Chief Justice of the King's Bench he displayed
qualities which won him the esteem of his fellow-citizens and the
hatred of the court. He lost his office by reason of his refusal to do
that which the king commanded.
In the prosecution of Essex, he used language which was utterly
unpardonable. When Raleigh was on trial for his life, he said,
"Thou art a monster, thou hast an English face but a Spanish heart,
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thou viper, for I thou thee, thou traitor, thou art thyself a spider of
hell." To a poor woman who came before him as Chief Justice,
charged with a capital crime, he said before the verdict was rendered,
that she had the seven deadly sins, to-wit: "a whore, a bawd, a sor-
cerer, a witch, a papist, a felon and a murderer." Yet as Chief Jus-
tice he defied the authority of the king himself. He gave an opinion
in opposition to the council that the king could not by his proclama-
tion create any offense which was an offense before. He dared to
release a prisoner of the Court of High Commission brought before
him by a writ of habeas corpus. He was promoted from the Com-
mon Pleas to the King's Bench for his humiliation and because the
place was one of less profit. The result of his "turbulent" carriage, as
the king called it, was that he was forbidden to ride his summer cir-
cuit and soon after removed from office. He received his dismissal
with "dejection and tears." Nevertheless, he retired with the general
applause, having somehow won the confidence of the people. Ben
Jonson wrote of him, in a sonnet addressed to his grandson:
"Cyriac, whose grandsire on the royal bench
A British Themis with no mean applause
Pronounced and in his volume taught our laws
Which others at their bar so often wrench."
His career in parliament was no less honorable. He opposed the
usurpation of the Crown, himself prepared the Petition of Right and
was sturdy in his opposition to the oppressions which ultimately pro-
voked the rebellion.
Coke was therefore at once admirable and despicable, or like a.
bit of bacon, part fat and part lean, as is all human nature. We are
concerned with his fame. Does he deserve the veneration with which
he is now regarded by lawyers? Upon what does his reputation rest?
Not alone upon his sturdy resistance to tyranny, for others who are
forgotten were brave and liberty-loving; not upon his magnanimity,
for none can admire his prosecutions of Raleigh and Essex; not upon
his love of justice, because he opposed with all his might the benign
innovations of the Lord Chancellor; not upon his generosity, cour-
tesy, or any of those sweeter qualities which constitute the gentle-
man, because he was at once mean, selfish, ambitious and unscrupu-
lous, and if he was learned in the law he seems to have been ignorant
of all else.
His fame rests perhaps upon his Institutes and Reports. I will
not attempt to appraise these remarkable books. They contain a law-
yer's mind, unashamed and undisguised. I must say, however, that
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they declare the law in all its foul deformity and that Coke admired
it, called it the summa ratio; revered it and thought it a sort of im-
piety to inquire into its excellent and admirable doctrines. He said
of it, "Nemonem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus.'
When we remember that the law allowed of attainder after
acquittal, punished with death more than a hundred petty crimes,
allowed of the torture of witnesses, of the peine forte et dure, of im-
prisonment for debt, of the writ capias ad respondendum, and that it
would not permit parties in interest to testify, and abounded in fic-
tions and pitfalls which seemed rather cunningly designed for the
vexation of litigants than to remedy wrong; wT cannot do otherwise
than pause before we join in the traditional homage of the Bar. Lord
Coke was Chief Justice of England, when a lad of ten, convicted in
Cambridge of firing a rick, as he mounted the scaffold said, "Please,
good people, forgive me this time, I will not do it again," yet was
hung by the neck until he was dead. If summa ratio can justify
such iniquity, then it is indeed a perverted, despicable and artificial
ratio and none should do it reverence. The corpus juris of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries was not a respectable body of law;
it was bad even as between private citizens; it allowed few remedies
and in many cases afforded none at all. It afforded few sanctions for
private liberty and private property. The courts of High Commission
and Star Chamber imprisoned without hearing and punished without
trial. Coke himself was unjustly confined. The Magna Charta was law
in name only. General warrants had not become illegal; searches and
seizures were constantly resorted to; indulgences and benevolences
were compelled; the dispensing power had not been curtailed; there
was neither free speech nor free printing; parliament could not pro-
tect its members; the language of James I. addressed to it upon a
solemn occasion was high, insolent and menacing. The judges might
whisper that the king was "sub deo et sub lege," but his subordina-
tion was never an obstacle to deeds wrong in morals and legally
wrong. How could a great lawyer honestly admire such a body of
law! Selden detested its iniquities, Bacon tried to ameliorate them.
Coke cherished them and was jealous of them and guarded them
with affectionate solicitude. He says:
"Knowledge of the law is like a deep well, out of which
each man draweth according to the strength of his under-
standing. He that reacheth deepest, he seeth the amiable and
admirable secrets of the law, wherein I assure you the sages
of the law in former times have had the deepest reach."
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He advises the student to confine himself to the law and to avoid
all other learning as "praepostera lectio" and an enemy to real learn-
ing. Coke does not commend any mean thing in the law, but neither
does he condemn any mean thing in it, yet it was full of wrong and
deserved condemnation, and he was familiar with all its cracks and
crannies. To what should we attribute the obsession of so strong
a mind? What made him stiff in resistance to innovation, content
with the past, contemptuous of general culture and indifferent to
cruelties and asperities which now amaze us? Were these things due
to his learning? Is there something in knowledge of the law which
pervents judgment and starves thinking? I cannot think the law
alone can have had such a result. Coke lived side by side with Bacon.
They were rivals, but Bacon became a great chancellor, a great philos-
opher and a great reformer. Coke was Selden's friend. Both were
learned in the law, but Selden was far more: he was a scholar and a
gentleman. The law itself could not have wrought such havoc with
the intelligence, for Bacon and Selden were also profoundly versed
in its mysteries. We must then search elsewhere for the explanation
of Lord Coke. Can it be found in his neglect of those liberating stud-
ies which he affected to despise and that "praepostera lectio" which
he deprecated?
Consider the things he despised. He lived throughout that
remarkable period which has ever since been called the English
renascence. He was born before and died after Shakespeare. The
fructifying influnces which made the literature of his time to flower
and flourish as never before were still powerful; the Bible had recently
been translated and made available for the use of the common people:
Hooker had created English prose: books had been put within the reach
of all by the printing press; the Reformation had emancipated men's
minds and the literature of Greece and Rome had enriched them;
new worlds had been discovered and the fabulous tales of hardy
adventurers had roused the dormant imaginations of men; Spenser,
Marlowe, Beaumont, Fletcher, Jonson, and a host of others almost
equal in faculty to Shakespeare, had poured out their rhapsodies;
Bacon, the master mind of the age, had re-established philosophy
upon a firm foundation; the threatened invasion of England by the
hosts of Spain had been quickly, gloriously and forever averted;
good Queen Bess reigned over Merrie England and all that lay in
the dust had risen and begun to sing. Under the kindling influences
of the, time that generation of men outran themselves. Many, gath-
ering capacity from their fellows, so increased in power, dazzled the
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world by the splendor of their accomplishments. They ived upon a
high plateau elevated into a rare and exhilarating atmosphere, seeking
and communicating knowledge. Coke alone communicated and de-
rived nothing from his contemporaries.
His style is stiff and rough. What he quotes is law Latin. There
is not in all his works a gleam of that sort of enlightenment which
results from scholarship. His law is a dead law, Hooker's a living
principle. Coke said:
"The common law is nothing else but reason, which is
to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason gotten
by long study, observation and experience and not of every
man's natural reason. If all the reason that is dispersed
into so many several heads were united in one, yet it could
not make such a law as the law of England is, because by
many successions of ages it hath been fined and refined by
an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long
experience grown to such a perfection as that no man ought
to be wiser than the law, which is the perfection of reason.
Lex civitus tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum
malum"-
by which he intended "The court should be governed by the principle
of law and not by the hardship of any particular case," said Lord
Ellenborough.1
Hooker said:
"Of law there can be no less acknowledged than that her
seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the-
world: all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the
very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted
from her power; both men and angels and creatures of what
condition sever, though each in different sort and manner,
yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of
peace and joy."
What a contrast! Coke's law is a petrified law, indifferent to
justice, scornful of private consequences, proud of its antiquity,
repugnant to enlightenment; Hooker's is the mother of peace and
joy, a generous aspiration, the helper of the people. Coke attributes
to his predecessors a wisdom and infallibility which he withholds
from his contemporaries. His veneration for them was his undoing.
That he was wrong is proved by the obsolescence of all that he cher-
ished. The innovations he resisted won their way. We have today
1 4 MauL. et S., 261.
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a corpus juris as wise as his but more benign. Equity has prevailed
over law. You cannot today enforce a bond which has been dis-
charged, upon the ground that .the discharge was not made by a
speciality; neither can you hang a boy for a petty act of wickedness.
That Coke's obsessions were due in some measure to the narrow-
ing effect of his intense and concentrated study of law cannot be
doubted. What is hardly won is eagerly cherished. Some men carry
their learning as porters carry corn, on their backs in a sack; and
some carry it in their bellies as affording food for wisdom. Coke
was by propensity one of the former. His laborious and habitual pur-
suit of special knowledge made him overvalue the fruits of his in-
dustry. Having spent so much energy in acquisition, he had not
enough for assimilation. It is frequently so with the mere scholar;
gazing at a star he is apt to fall into a ditch. The love of learning,
like avarice, inclines to hoarding. The black-letter lawyer is much
like the miser: the one starves his body and the other his mind. To
consume knowledge, to convert it into new and strange thinking seems
somehow a desecration to a mere student. Coke loved his learning,
he could not endure to have it undervalued, he hated those easy-
going philosophers who pretended to perceive without effort what had
cost him long years of labor. He therefore inclined always to
authority and scorned what men called reason and justice. We per-
ceive in his prosecution of Raleigh something more than zeal for the
king's service; the lawyer hated the brillant offender. Raleigh was
at once a poet, a philosopher, a soldier, a statesman, an historian and
a courtier. Coke detested the versatility, charm and distinction of
the man of the world. He seems always to have hated letters and
literary men. I cannot find that he ever resorted to the Mermaid.
The brilliant men of his time were unpleasant to him: he could not
answer them. They did not yield to his authorities and were scornful
of his learning.
Jonson was a free-thinker who dared claim equality with any
man:
"I do not desire to be equal to those that went before
but to have my reasons examined with theirs and so much to
be given to them as they deserve. I will have no man ad-
dict himself to me, but, if I say anything right defend it as
true, non mihi cedendum sed veritati,"
however humble it may sound to the reader, was a proud man's dec-
laration of independence. Coke disliked the wits; he could not com-
pete with them; they denied his superiority.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol4/iss1/2
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Coke was not only a black-letter lawyer, he was if not in name
yet in character a Puritan. I hesitate to speak with levity of so
formidable a thing as the Puritan -character, yet it provokes levity.
What is the Puritan? Is he not one of those who, obsessed by ego-
tism, denies to another the right to a like obsession? His philosophy
was simple enough: God wrote the Scriptures for men, and had wit
enough to say what He meant, and men who read Him understand
what He intended, and ceremonies and decorated cathedrals and vest-
ments and images are obstructions to piety because they cloud under-
standing and tend to idolatry. That such a doctrine lacked logic was
unimportant; it satisfied self-righteousness. Logic might have sug-
gested that if two honest men cannot agree with respect to the mean-
ing of the Scriptures, either God did not write them or He did not
intend mankind to understand them. It was however, pleasant to an
egotist to bring himself-into immediate contact with God, and so the
Puritan hated the established church and all pagan learning and all
beauty and all else that might distract the mind from the holy con-
templation of what he regarded as revealed truths. Puritanism tended
to self-sufficiency and what we call fanaticism.
Coke being at once a black-letter lawyer and a Puritan, had his
share of the blinding prepossessions which pertain to each character.
He rejected culture and the enlightenment which resulted from dis-
cursive reading instinctively, denouncing it as "praepostera lectio"
because his bigotry hated innovation. Selden and Bacon perceived
the deformities of the law because they had become superior to it
by reason of their familiarity with those general considerations of
which conventional law is but an important part. They knew as much
law as Coke, but they knew much else besides. Neither was a Puri-
tant; both rejected fanaticism because both had become humble un-
der the influence of that sort of thinking which cannot rely upon
memory for conviction. They mingled with the wits, derived light
from conflict, were open-minded to the new learning and so fortified,
dared question those sacred principles which Coke regarded with
reverence. Who questioned the law and was denied a reason became
an innovator.
Nevertheless, Coke has become and remained a great man, while
Selden is forgotten. Coke's fame rests upon tradition, and that tra-
dition upon the lawyer's propensity now as always to cherish what is
reputed to be great. Coke was never a great lawyer. He was never
equal to Bacon, yet because lawyers have said he was great we insist
that he was so. Addicted to authority, we like the serenity it affords:
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it saves thinking, and thinking is ever more distressing than investi-
gation. I think the reputation of Coke has done harm to genera-
tions of lawyers. He stands for an idea which is perilous, and that
idea is that lawyers must be narrow in order to be thorough. Nothing
can be farther from the truth. I prefer that great saying of Milton:
"That is a complete and generous education which fits a
man to perform justly, skillfully and magnanimously all the
offices, both public and private, of peace and of war."
Coke lacked such an education. So much of his fame as results
from his resistance to tyranny he deserves. As Chief Justice he
became associated with the rights of man as opposed to the preroga-
tives of kings and in that character, but in that character alone, does
he deserve the veneration of posterity.
I. H. LIONBERGER.
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